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The concept of key terrain is a common fixture in military strategy and tactics. 
The emergence of cyberspace, with characteristics unseen in any warfighting domain, 
challenge the concept’s value. This work is a conceptual analysis that examines the 
applicability of key terrain in the cyber domain. To determine if key terrain applies in 
cyberspace, we examine key terrain in traditional physical warfighting domains to 
understand the concept and draw comparisons. Each of the three layers of cyberspace is 
examined to determine if the concept of key terrain applies and to identify challenges 
presented when applying the concept. The result of this work finds key terrain to hold 
value and applicability within cyberspace. Key terrain can be found at each layer of 
cyberspace but with some considerations. Cyber key terrain requires constant 
reassessment, exists only under certain conditions, and can present difficulties in terms of 
measuring seizure and retention of terrain in cyberspace. The conclusion additionally 
finds that while cyberspace is unique, it does not require a cyber-specific key terrain 
definition. We recommend that changes be made to future doctrine, institutional 
education, and leader development in an effort to provide clarity when using traditional 
military concepts such as key terrain in cyberspace. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  FOCUS AND RESEARCH QUESTION .................................................2 
B.  PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH ...............................2 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 
1.  Lack of Definition for Key Terrain in Cyberspace .....................4 
2.  Emphasis on Physical Network Layer .........................................7 
3.  Confusion of Terminology ...........................................................10 
4.  Questioning Key Terrain’s Application in Cyberspace ...........11 
5.  Layer Composition of Cyberspace .............................................12 
6.  Cyber Key Terrain Is Relevant ..................................................13 
D.  METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................14 
E.  THESIS OVERVIEW .............................................................................15 
II.  KEY TERRAIN IN THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN .............................................17 
A.  INTRODUCTION....................................................................................17 
B.  DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF KEY TERRAIN .....................................18 
C.  HOW THE DOD DEFINES KEY TERRAIN .......................................19 
D.  HOW IS KEY TERRAIN IDENTIFIED? .............................................20 
1.  Operational Environment ...........................................................20 
2.  OAKOC ........................................................................................23 
E.  KEY TERRAIN COMPARISON AMONG DOMAINS......................25 
1.  Land Domain ................................................................................25 
2.  Maritime Domain .........................................................................26 
3.  Air Domain ...................................................................................26 
4.  Space Domain ...............................................................................27 




B.  WHAT IS CYBERSPACE? ....................................................................31 
1.  Nonphysical Qualities of Cyberspace .........................................32 
2.  Dynamic Environment.................................................................32 
C.  CYBER TERRAIN COMPOSITION: THREE LAYERS ..................33 
D.  DOD AND CYBERSPACE .....................................................................35 
1.  Emergence of Cyber Warfighting Domain ................................37 
2.  DOD Cyberspace Operations......................................................38 
 viii
E.  COMPARISON OF CYBERSPACE TO OTHER DOMAINS...........39 
1.  Cyber Dependencies .....................................................................39 
2.  Borderless Environment ..............................................................40 
3.  Maneuverability in Cyberspace ..................................................41 
F.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................42 
IV.  KEY TERRAIN AND CYBERSPACE ..............................................................43 
A.  INTRODUCTION....................................................................................43 
B.  WHAT CYBER KEY TERRAIN IS NOT ............................................43 
C.  APPLYING KEY TERRAIN TO THE LAYERS OF 
CYBERSPACE ........................................................................................45 
1.  Key Terrain at the Physical Layer .............................................46 
2.  Key Terrain at the Logical Layer ...............................................47 
3.  Key Terrain at the Cyber-persona Layer ..................................49 




A.  OVERALL EVALUATION ....................................................................55 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ........................58 
C.  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................58 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................61 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1.  Operational Variables. Source: Department of the Army (2012, p. 1–
7). ...............................................................................................................22 
Figure 2.  Mission Variables. Source: Department of the Army (2012, p. 1–9). .......23 
Figure 3.  The Levels of War. Source: Department of the Army (2008, p. 6–2). ......28 
Figure 4.  The Three Layers of Cyberspace. Source: USJCS (2013a, p. I-3). ...........34 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
APT advanced persistent threat 
ARPANET Advanced research project agency network 
AUSA Association of the United States Army 
BFT Blue Force Tracking 
BIOS Basic input/output system 
BMDS ballistic missile defense system 
CJA  Crown Jewels Analysis 
CO cyberspace operations 
COA course of action 
COP common operating picture 
D-Day June 6, 1944 
DCO defensive cyberspace operations 
DDoS distributed denial of service 
DMZ demilitarized zone 
DNS domain name server 
DOD Department of Defense 
DODIN-OPS Department of Defense information network operations 
EMS electromagnetic spectrum 
FM Field Manual 
GPS Global Positioning System 
IOT Internet of Things 
IP Internet protocol 
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace 
IPV6 Internet Protocol Version 6 
IT information technology 
JFC Joint Force Commander 
JFHQ-DODIN Joint Force Headquarters—Department of Defense information 
network operations 
JIPOE Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
JP joint publication 
 xii
LOC line of communication 
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, 
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and 
decisive terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment 
OCO offensive cyberspace operations 
PII personally identifiable information 
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, 
physical environment and time 
SAMS-E Standard Army Maintenance System - Enhanced 
SATCOM satellite communications 
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition 
SLOC sea lines of communication 
SQL structured query language 
TCP transmission control protocol 
 time available, and civil considerations 
URL uniform resource locator 
USCENTCOM United States Central Command 
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command 




I would like to thank Dr. Wade Huntley and Dr. Duane Davis for their guidance 
and assistance on this thesis. I want to thank Chloe Woida of the Graduate Writing Center 
for her assistance in helping me to decipher what I was trying to say. I would like to 
thank all the professors that I have had the opportunity to learn from. Each and every one 
of you provided some piece to this work. Last but not least, I want to thank my wife, 
Kelsey, for her love and support. You allow me to do great things and I appreciate you 
listening to my talks about abstract concepts in complex environments.  
 
 xiv




Admiral Michael S. Rogers, while addressing the House Committee on Armed 
Services in March 2016, described the mission of the then newly formed JFHQ-DODIN 
“to oversee the day-to-day operation of DOD’s networks and mount an active defense of 
them, securing their key cyber terrain and being prepared to neutralize any adversary who 
manages to bypass their perimeter defenses” (Hearing to receive testimony on U.S. 
Strategic Command, 2016). While addressing an audience at the 2016 AUSA conference 
on potential vulnerabilities posed to military information systems, the vice chief of staff 
of the Army, General Daniel Allyn stated, “Commanders and Soldiers must know their 
key cyber terrain, understand the risk at each level, where essential data resides, and take 
necessary steps to reduce the threat” (Allyn, 2016, para. 15). These examples of military 
leaders using the term “cyber key terrain” demonstrates the use of traditional military 
vocabulary, concepts, and doctrine when discussing cyberspace. At first thought, this 
inherently makes sense as these concepts and processes have been used, integrated, and 
tested over the course of the U.S. military’s history. The term “key cyber terrain” is 
something of a buzzword within the military leading one to automatically accept its 
functionality and fit in cyberspace. However, careful analysis may potentially determine 
instances in which these concepts have no meaning or lack applicability to the cyber 
domain. Understanding of key terrain and the environment of cyberspace presents 
questions: What exactly is cyber key terrain? Where or how, is it identified? Does the 
concept traditionally used to identify geographic and manmade structures mesh with the 
nonphysical environment of cyberspace?  
Though its use is prevalent, many questions have potentially not been addressed 
as needed to ensure a common understanding of the concept of key terrain in cyberspace. 
This thesis will examine the question of whether the traditional military concept of key 
terrain can be adapted to the cyber domain, and if so, how that can be achieved. 
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A. FOCUS AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The focus of this thesis is to examine whether the traditional concept of key 
terrain has applicability in the cyberspace domain. This research will examine a doctrinal 
concept traditionally used in physical domains and determine how it applies to the non-
physical layers of cyberspace (logical and cyber persona). To make this determination it 
is necessary to answer secondary research questions to scope the overall research 
question. First, why is key terrain in the physical domains important to military 
operations? Second, what is cyberspace and why is it important to the U.S. military? Last, 
does the concept of key terrain adequately apply to the non-physical layers of 
cyberspace? These questions will guide this thesis and help answer the overarching 
research question of whether the traditional military concept of key terrain can be adapted 
to the cyber domain, and if so, how that can be achieved. 
It is important to understand that two of the chapters of this thesis will provide 
necessary background information and doctrinal understandings to frame the final 
assessment of applying key terrain to cyberspace. These chapters are meant to appeal to 
divergent audiences who may not have a complete understanding of either the concept of 
key terrain or the cyber domain and why these two are important to the DOD. These 
chapters will reference known material but with a focus on cyber key terrain.  
B. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
Major General Stephen Fogerty, the former commanding General of the Army’s 
Cyber Center of Excellence, explains that “to win in a complex world, we must dominate 
the cyber domain” (U.S. Army Cyber Center of Excellence, 2015, para. 4). The ability to 
establish and maintain dominance in the cyber domain will heavily rely on foundational 
doctrine to instruct and guide the future cyber warriors of the U.S. military. Efforts to 
examine the applicability of existing doctrine and strategies to the cyber domain is 
essential to ensuring that current doctrine and strategies maintain relevance in 
cyberspace. Some concepts may have no place or meaning in cyberspace, while others 
may require refining or adjustment to meet the environment of cyberspace.  
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This thesis will search for the concept of key terrain’s existence in the cyber 
domain to determine its application and value. In doing so, this research will explore 
what refinements or considerations must be taken into account to effectively integrate the 
concept into the cyber domain. With such analysis and understanding, the concept of 
cyber key terrain can provide beneficial effects to the cyber domain and cyber operational 
planning.  
The importance of this research is that it contributes to an area in which limited 
scope of attention has been placed. This thesis will contribute to the body of research by 
examining a concept that many misunderstand or overlook in the cyber domain. 
Understanding cyber key terrain will better enable commanders to identify and prioritize 
assets and objectives for both defensive and offensive cyber operations. The importance 
of this research is hinged upon the fact that doctrinal processes and training will 
ultimately contribute to the success of the U.S. military achieving cyber dominance. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite the lack of literature on cyber key terrain, there are varying opinions on 
what cyber key terrain means, how it is defined, and whether it applies to cyberspace. 
Four relevant themes emerge in the literature review. First, there is no definitive cyber 
key terrain definition but rather a collection of definitions. The DOD, scholars, and 
private sector experts offer conflicting definitions and interpretations of the concept. 
Second, examples of cyber key terrain tend to focus on physical rather than the 
nonphysical manifestations. Using mainly physical manifestations may be the result of 
the instinctual habit of relating key terrain to physical properties. Third, confusion 
surrounds the use of multiple terms that are used interchangeably with key terrain. While 
these terms are similar, they have different meanings depending on type of operations and 
contexts. Last, while most analytical works accept the concept of key terrain in 
cyberspace without question, a few works suggest that the concept does not have 
applicability to the cyber domain. Furthermore, this perspective highlights that while 
works accept the concept in cyberspace, the discussion on how cyber key terrain is 
specifically applicable to the cyber domain is missing or not clearly captured. 
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1. Lack of Definition for Key Terrain in Cyberspace 
A prevailing DOD definition of “cyber key terrain” does not exist. Joint 
Publication 3–12, Cyberspace Operations, is the joint doctrine publication that governs 
military activities and offers guidance for planning in cyberspace. Its purpose is to 
provide “military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 
other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and 
training” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff [USJCS], 2013a, p. i). JP 3–12, defines key 
terrain as “any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked 
advantage to either combatant” (p. II-10). This defines the concept of key terrain in the 
physical domain. This same definition is consistently found throughout military doctrine 
regardless of branch of service. However, no military doctrine, including JP 3–12, 
provides a definition for the concept of “cyber key terrain.” While JP 3–12 does not 
define cyber key terrain, it does state that key terrain in cyberspace “involves network 
links and nodes that are essential to a particular friendly or adversary capability” (p. II-
10). “Network links and nodes” offer a vague description when defining key terrain in 
cyberspace. JP 3–12 stresses the importance of key terrain in cyberspace but does not 
clearly explain what it is within the layers of cyberspace or how it can be identified. One 
potential hypothesis for this missing definition could be the DOD’s belief that the current 
key terrain definition serves as a fitting definition in cyberspace despite its non-physical 
terrain. Another potential hypothesis could be the constantly changing environment of 
cyberspace does not allow for a definitive definition. 
Outside of doctrine, various authors have attempted to define cyber key terrain. 
Raymond, Conti, Cross, and Nowatkowski (2014) acknowledge the fact that military 
doctrine does not define either “cyber terrain” or “cyber key terrain” and instead offer 
their own definitions. They refer to cyber terrain as “the systems, devices, protocols, data, 
software, processes, cyber personas, and other networked entities that comprise, 
supervise, and control cyberspace” (p. 290), and define cyber key terrain as “systems, 
devices, protocols, data, software, processes, cyber personas, or other network entities, 
the control of which offers a marked advantage to an attacker or defender” (p. 294). 
Raymond et al.’s definition is far less vague than the doctrinal examples and presents 
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non-physical attributes like protocols, data, and cyber personas as the terrain features of 
cyberspace that could potentially be identified as key terrain. 
Hobbs (2007) defines what he calls digital key terrain as “any network feature 
that, if controlled, will provide a tactical advantage” (p. 4). He concludes that “this will 
be based on the layout of the target, and the target’s network, but there will always be a 
few features that constitute key terrain” (p. 4). The definition is succinct but broad, as use 
of the term ‘network feature’ implies a vast number of things but does not specify the 
non-physical manifestations of cyberspace. However, Hobbs does support standard 
tactics and methodologies being applied to cyberspace and uses the tactical planning tool 
OCOKA, a mnemonic used for terrain analysis in the military, to demonstrate its 
usefulness in the cyber domain. 
Kern (2015) defines cyber key terrain “as any physical, logical, or persona 
element of the cyberspace domain, including commercial services, the disruption, 
degradation, or destruction of which constricts combat power, affording a marked 
advantage to either combatant” (p. 13). His definition suggests the fact that key terrain 
could potentially exist in different layers of cyberspace. Kern presents the fact that key 
cyber terrain will rarely be in the control of the joint force, which is unlike any other 
warfighting domains. To demonstrate this lack of control, Kern uses the example of the 
inability to militarize and protect cyberspace in a way that the air space of the U.S. was 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
“Key Defensive Terrain in Cyberspace: A Geographic Perspective” by Pingel 
(2003) focuses on a comparison of fortifying cities and computer networks. In doing so, 
Pingel provides three examples “firewalls, bastion hosts, and DMZs” and relates them to 
the physical manifestations used to protect cities (p. 4). Pingel defines terrain as 
encompassing “the irregularities and configuration of the medium of conflict in whatever 
forms it may take” and defines key terrain using the definition in U.S. Army Operations 
Manual (now currently FM 3–0) (p. 2). Pingel is one of the few authors to present an 
accepted doctrinal definition as the basis for defining key terrain in cyberspace. He 
presents the importance of the understanding of key terrain by stating “the success of an 
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attack on, or defense of, a network depends heavily on how well key terrain of the 
network is understood and incorporated” (p. 4). 
Riley (2014) defines key terrain in cyberspace as “key assets, accounts, data, 
etc.,” asserting that a loss of these items to a threat actor would render a significant defeat 
to a defender (para. 27). His definition is simplistic; however, it does acknowledge non-
physical cyber terrain characteristics such as accounts and data. This is yet another 
example that demonstrates the lack of prevailing or accepted “cyber key terrain” 
definition. 
In contrast to such attempts to define cyber key terrain, others see the traditional 
doctrinal definition as sufficient. Lanham (2012) suggests the need to maintain traditional 
military vocabulary when discussing warfare in the cyber domain. Lanham argues the 
best approach “is to use the military decision making process, augmented with doctrinal 
Joint and Army graphics, and treat cyber terrain approximately the same as we treat the 
land and air domains” (p. 7). His article contributes to the argument that communicating 
key terrain in cyberspace will be better received if use of accustomed planning processes, 
terms, and tools are maintained. Lanham presents this exact point stating, “instead of 
using the civilian-dominated language of enclaves, intrusion detection systems, and 
firewalls, use Joint Publication and Field Manual 1–02 language such as sensor, 
positions, strong points, LOCs, communications zones, deliberate defense, and deliberate 
operations” (p. 9). Lanham suggests that using existing vocabulary “is more likely to 
retain the interest, understanding, and resource commitment of commanders than by 
‘going geek’ on them” (p. 11). In addition, Lanham supports his conclusion stating that 
he “has not seen evidence in the classified or unclassified realms that convince him of the 
added value of creating unique-to-cyber processes and vocabulary” (p. 11). 
Williams (2014) agrees that current doctrine may suffice, stressing “established 
joint doctrine accommodates operations in cyberspace quite well, so we do not need to 
invent anything new. USCYBERCOM staff has found that there are few adjustments 
required to integrate cyberspace operations into existing planning and execution 
processes” (p. 13). Williams point supports the argument that the invention of a new 
definition may not be necessary as current doctrine applies to cyberspace. 
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Applegate, Carpenter, and West (2017) additionally support this conclusion 
stating that “there is no need to create a separate definition for cyber key terrain, as the 
joint definition for key terrain is adequate and applicable across all domains” (p. 22). This 
argument supports the fact that despite the differences and non-physical attributes of the 
cyber domain, the concept of key terrain applies and requires no different definition. 
Additionally, Applegate et al. argue that previous efforts are flawed in their 
methodologies in regards to three assessments. “First, in almost every case, the 
researchers focused on what items should be considered key terrain rather than on how to 
identify key terrain in a contextual manner. Second, previous efforts omitted the planning 
concepts of objective and mission, which are essential to identifying key terrain for a 
military operation. Finally, these efforts often confused or misidentified key terrain with 
critical assets” (p. 19). 
Taking these analyses as a whole, there is clearly no strong consensus on the 
meaning of the concept of key terrain in cyberspace. This analytical uncertainty forms the 
backdrop for the absence of a single DOD definition. However, in this conceptual 
discussion some trends are apparent, as the following sub-section discusses. 
2. Emphasis on Physical Network Layer 
There is a notable theme of literature advocating for the use of “cyber key 
terrain,” most works do not effectively identify or pay attention to the non-physical layers 
of cyberspace. Instead they tend to gravitate toward physical layer examples. The 
abundance of literature using examples of mainly physical manifestations as cyber key 
terrain may drive that lack of a prevailing definition.  
Hobbs (2007) uses the example of “last hop routers, domain controllers and 
internal hosts” when describing key terrain, which demonstrates physical layer 
manifestations (p. 4–5). Mills (2012) identifies what he terms “earthly manifestations” 
that include “data centers, commercial Internet service providers, undersea cables, 
International Standards bodies, BIOS, supply chain, cyber workforce, and innovation as 
key terrain elements that show significant pressure points for Cyber” (p. 100). Mills 
suggests that despite cyber being the land of “one’s and zero’s” it still has physical 
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manifestations that include data centers and undersea cables and stresses that “assuming 
the cyber domain may free us of traditional Clausewitzean key terrain concepts … is a 
faulty logical starting point because Cyber does have physical manifestations” (p. 99). 
Dressler (2015) presents the fact that cyber key terrain identification “includes all 
critical information, systems, and infrastructure; whether owned by the organization or 
used in transit by its information” (p. 49–50). This again demonstrates physical layer 
manifestations, with the “in transit” possibly referring to data or logical information sent 
through transmission. Regardless, this does not specify the non-physical properties that 
will most likely be encountered in cyberspace. Dressler does present a hypothetical 
operational case study, in which a Joint Task Force Commander designates his logistical 
support information systems as cyber key terrain (Dressler, 2015). While the example 
was not intended to specify cyber components and their layers, this example ignores the 
specificity that key terrain in cyberspace requires. For example, better identification of 
key terrain may be the administrative level accounts (cyber persona) or IP addresses and 
resident data (logical layer) rather than the system as a whole. 
Thomas (2014) addresses the potential qualities of a cyber strategist and proposes 
curriculum areas needed to educate and train cyber strategists of the future. Thomas 
describes terrain in which a cyber strategist must consider such as “optical fiber, Internet 
service providers (ISPs), routers, switches, wireless links, terrestrial gateways and 
underwater cables of all types, satellites, power stations, and many other features often 
described as tubes, both visible and invisible” (p. 379). All of these examples 
demonstrate physical manifestations. Thomas does not offer cyber key terrain examples 
but alludes to key terrain, stating that cyber terrain features “must be protected and 
monitored, but they also represent key areas of influence or manipulation” (p. 379). 
“Awaiting Cyber 9/11” by Magee (2013) discusses the need for a cyber strategy 
that includes legislative development on cyber security, protection of critical 
infrastructure, and additional authorities to DOD in order to execute cyber defense. 
Magee proposes that in protecting critical infrastructure, use of a cyber common 
operating picture (COP) would be effective. While discussing the potential for a COP, 
Magee references the Armed Forces focus of selecting, capturing, and retaining key 
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terrain (Magee, 2013). Magee asserts that “Similarly, the cyber COP would focus on key 
cyber terrain. The cyber terrain would need to be a prioritized list of key nodes that 
encompass the .gov, .mil, and .com domains” (p. 80). The visibility provided by key 
terrain would assist in the overall situational awareness required of the cyber domain 
(Magee, 2013). A prioritized list of key nodes is organic to the physical layer. The 
prioritized list of key nodes presented by Magee lacks the inclusion of non-physical cyber 
terrain elements that may be identified as key in order to better enhance situational 
awareness. 
Despite the abundance of physical layer examples there are some that 
acknowledge the potential for non-physical manifestations as key terrain. One such 
example is seen by Kieffer (2016) in which he uses an administrative account (cyber 
persona layer) as an example of key terrain, while comparing and contrasting the IPB 
processes usefulness in the cyber domain. Kieffer argues that, “Control over an 
administrative account grants access to new ‘area’ and ‘structures’ thus helping 
espionage and therefore an ‘area-of-influence’” (p. 4). This example demonstrates a non-
physical cyber layer element (admin account) owning the attributes of key cyber terrain. 
Brigadier General George J. Franz III (2012) describes the potential for cyber key 
terrain to be such elements as fiber optic cable, satellite communication (SATCOM) 
uplink/downlink, subnets, databases with usernames and passwords, and technicians. 
Franz description presents some non-physical attributes of cyberspace but also includes 
people. Franz states that “key terrain applies to those physical and logical elements of the 
domain that enable mission essential warfighting functions” (Franz, 2012, slide 7). This 
was additionally referenced as the definition of cyber key terrain in a MITRE technical 
report on “Mapping the Cyber Terrain” by Bodeau, Graubart, and Heinbockel (2013).  
Williams (2014) furthers demonstrates the nonphysical nature of key terrain by 
representing the potential for multi-layer existence for key terrain in cyberspace. 
Williams supports the argument that cyber key terrain is more than just one feature or 
object; it more than likely consists of various layers and dependencies. Williams, using 
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) as a key terrain example, demonstrates the 
complexity and robustness of key terrain in the cyber domain. In the context of a DCO 
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mission, Williams uses a scenario of a commander identifying the BMDS to his staff as 
key terrain. Williams suggests the next step is to “technically enumerate the key cyber 
terrain from sensor to shooter” (pp. 15–16). For the BMDS, Williams asserts that there is 
a need to understand and view the system in its entirety, thus it will include all the 
“various sensors that collect launch data and the networks and systems that move that 
data to a variety of command centers for attack assessment” (p. 16). This demonstrates 
the end-point to end-point assessment that must be done, more commonly referred to as 
“sensor to shooter.” The intricate network of the BMDS opens the door for potential 
weaknesses from multiple attack vectors. From a DCO perspective Williams suggests 
that “there are more vulnerabilities than we can address, and therefore we must prioritize 
our efforts against adversaries with specific capability and intent to interfere with our key 
cyber terrain” (p. 16). 
Thus, a few assessments open the door to thinking about how the concept of key 
terrain might extend to nonphysical dimensions of cyberspace. These assessments fall 
short of applying the key terrain concept to nonphysical cyberspace systematically or 
confronting the challenges of translating an intrinsically physical concept to this 
application.  
3. Confusion of Terminology 
There are various terms both within the military and private sector that are used 
interchangeably with key terrain. One example is seen by Riley (2014) when he defines 
key terrain and uses the term “crown jewels analysis.” After defining key terrain Riley 
states “within the cybersecurity world this [key terrain] is generally known as Crown 
Jewels analysis” (para. 27). This is potentially incorrect and more importantly a cause for 
confusion. Riley goes on to associate critical assets as key terrain stating, “By looking at 
the critical assets [key terrain] within the defender’s cyber terrain, through techniques 
such as crown jewels analysis, and then determining who would want those assets and 
why, defenders can better understand the kinds of threat actors that they are likely to face, 
the patterns of attack associated with those types of threat actors, and ultimately the 
weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and configuration issues that are likely to be exploited in an 
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attack” (Riley, 2014, para. 29). In this excerpt, Riley interchangeably uses “key terrain,” 
“critical assets,” and “crown jewels.” One cannot say this is a flaw as the understanding 
of key terrain appears to vary among authors and the military, but it does suggest that 
there are some misinterpretations or misunderstandings of the concept of key terrain. 
While presenting the facts of what may be the first documented Cyberwar, Hollis 
(2011) concludes with a lesson on the need for cyber targets to be identified and access 
developed prior to any military operations. Hollis presents the argument that “identifying 
and then monitoring the health of national critical infrastructure or ‘key terrain’ in 
cyberspace (ex: government networks; critical communications nodes; national-level 
power, financial, and health networks; selected media outlets; and vital enclave networks) 
are critical to providing advanced warning of aggression” (Hollis, 2011, p. 6). In his 
point, Hollis equates critical infrastructure and key terrain as the same thing. This may 
again not be a flaw but does pose some confusion as to whether the two are actually the 
same. 
The argument of misuse of the term “key terrain” was additionally pointed out by 
Applegate et al. (2017) who argue that the imprecise use of terms such as “critical 
assets,” “crown jewels,” and “key terrain” implies a lack of understanding of the concept. 
This misunderstanding of the concept was additionally presented by Dressler (2015). 
Dressler references the point that there may be a gap in the understanding of cyber key 
terrain with the commanders at the higher echelons. Dressler suggests that “strategic and 
operational commanders do not know or fully understand how to determine their cyber 
key terrain. If they do, typically, they have not taken the required actions or time to 
determine and designate cyber key terrain” (p. 54). Whether true or not this demonstrates 
yet another argument supporting a gap in the understanding of the concept in cyberspace. 
4. Questioning Key Terrain’s Application in Cyberspace 
Some challenge or question altogether the applicability or usefulness of the 
concept of key terrain in the cyber domain. Libicki (2012) describes what he calls 
“conceptual errors that may arise by thinking of cyberspace as a warfighting domain 
analogous to the traditional warfighting domains” (p. 322). He references the example of 
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“key terrain” questioning whether it holds value in cyberspace. Libicki argues that while 
it is true of any network to have some physical nodes and services that are more 
important than others, their ownership may result in an empty victory, due to the 
malleability of cyberspace such as software (Libicki, 2012). He is alluding to the fact that 
ownership in cyberspace may not be an obtainable or measurable feat and adds that 
“offensive cyberspace operations generally cannot break physical nodes and the services 
provided by networks can be and are increasingly virtualized” (p. 332–333). Libicki 
asserts that he is not dispelling the concept but questions the concept’s true accuracy in 
the cyber domain. He concludes by presenting the fact that the ground warfare metaphor 
of “key terrain” may be misleading especially at the more senior officer levels (Libicki, 
2012). 
Gioe (2016) asserts that “in land warfare, identifying, seizing and holding key 
terrain is of critical importance” and this same concept remains true in the cyber domain 
(Gioe, 2016, para. 3). Gioe argues that while the concept remains true in cyberspace there 
are also caveats. “First, cyber operations can help commanders actually change some of 
the virtual key terrain itself. Secondarily, unlike land warfare, cyber operations can be 
present on key terrain (and perhaps hold it) without the enemy identifying this presence, 
or understanding its hold over the key terrain. In this sense, the maneuver principle of 
observation can be both closer and concealed in the virtual realm” (Gioe, 2016, para. 3). 
5. Layer Composition of Cyberspace 
Another notable point of contention is the fact that there are multiple perspectives 
on the layer composition of cyberspace. JP 3–12 describes three layers, but other works 
see additional layers, which may ignite misunderstandings of the concept or be the result 
of varying definitions. 
Shawn Riley’s cyber terrain model is built off of the DOD’s efforts representing 
the physical and virtual layers while additionally representing the full triangle of 
sustainment or the three pillars of cybersecurity: People—Organizations & Processes—
Technology (Riley, 2014). Riley argues the need for a model that represents both 
physical, real-world, and virtual layers of cyberspace (Riley, 2014). 
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Raymond, Conti, Cross, Nowatkowski (2014) describe cyberspace as five planes 
rather than DOD’s three layers. However, three of the planes relate exactly to the three 
layers of JP 3–12. Raymond et al. offer real world examples of potential objects that fall 
into these layers/planes. Raymond et al. describes “a poorly configured wireless device 
that uses an obsolete security protocol” as potential key terrain at the physical plane (p. 
295). At the logical plane, they use the example of key terrain as “the Domain Name 
System (DNS), which provides logical mappings between domain names (such as 
www.ccdcoe.org) and their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (such as 195.222.11.253)” (p. 
295). At the cyber persona plane they identify key terrain as “a system administrator’s 
account ... if possession of that account could be used by an attacker to compromise a 
defender’s resources” (p. 295). Raymond et al. additionally present the fact that “even an 
unprivileged user account could be key depending on the owner of the account” (p. 295). 
Based on the literature for this review, Raymond, Conti, Cross, and Nowatkowski are the 
only authors that present clear examples of what they consider key terrain at each 
cyberspace layer.  
6. Cyber Key Terrain Is Relevant 
Despite the varying opinions and understanding of cyber key terrain, the most 
common theme found among the literature suggests that the control and understanding of 
cyber key terrain is essential to the defensive posture of the U.S. military in the cyber 
domain. Additionally, there is support for the assessment and update of cyber doctrine as 
it too is necessary for the success of the U.S. military.  
Winterfeld (2001), recognizing the speed at which technology is advancing, 
suggests that “as the U.S. Army transitions into the digital age it is imperative to 
determine how to port their analog doctrine or business processes into a digital doctrine 
that moves at the speed of the Internet” (p. 8). Winterfeld, in the context of IPB doctrine, 
champions the idea that current doctrine should be readdressed and developed to capture 
the changing environment of cyberspace. In addition to development of cyber IPB 
doctrine, Winterfeld suggests updated doctrine be integrated into training installations 
and exercises to ensure leaders are ready to use it during the next conflict.  
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Pingel (2003) additionally sees the importance of key terrain in cyberspace. 
Pingel suggests that “the success of an attack on, or defense of, a network depends 
heavily on how well key terrain of the network is understood and incorporated” (p. 4). 
Mills (2012) argues that “critical cyber terrain must be controlled, or at least decisively 
influenced, to maintain relevancy in contemporary cyber and to help build the future path 
and direction of cyber. … The cyber domain is subject to the role of key terrain just as 
the legacy domains of the past” (p. 105). Lewis (2016) stresses that “knowing cyber key 
terrain not only enables offensive maneuver also provides additional disruption to the 
enemy’s intrusion kill chain in cyberspace by limiting at least one step in the payload 
delivery” (Lewis, 2016). Riley (2014) presents the point that finding key terrain allows 
for the defender to better understand threat actors, patterns of attack, and ultimately 
weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and configuration issues that may be exploitable.  
The point that all of these authors make is that key terrain has relevance and 
importance in the cyber domain and that efforts to better understand and educate leaders 
in the military is necessary to achieve defensive goals in cyberspace. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a conceptual analysis of a question that relies on the understanding 
of the concept of key terrain and the cyber domain. In drawing upon military doctrine, 
this thesis will use the DOD’s definition of the concept of key terrain as the foundational 
base when discussing the concept in cyberspace. In regards to the composition of 
cyberspace this thesis will accept the three-layer composition of cyberspace defined by 
the DOD. Before analyzing the concept of key terrain in cyberspace, it is necessary to 
understand key terrain in military strategy and tactics. Key terrain is explained using 
military doctrine in order to understand the conditions needed for its use. Before applying 
the concept of key terrain to cyberspace, it is necessary to understand the composition of 
cyberspace, how it works and why the military is dependent on it for operations. This 
requires the examination of military cyber doctrine, scholarly literature on the 
functionality of cyberspace, and examples of military dependence on cyberspace.  
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To apply key terrain to cyberspace, analysis of key terrain application at each 
layer is required. This evaluation identifies if the concept fits in the layer, where it fits, 
and potential challenges or constraints to applying. This is done at each layer in order to 
assess the overall application of key terrain in cyberspace. The analysis of the application 
will also examine the need for a cyber-specific key terrain definition to see if it will help 
or hinder efforts to clarify key terrain in cyberspace. The research and secondary 
questions are answered once a clear understanding of the concept of key terrain, the cyber 
domain, and key terrain’s application within the layers of cyberspace is achieved. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is composed of five chapters in total. The focus and intent of each 
chapter is as follows:  
Chapter I frames the current problem, outlines the research question for this 
thesis, and provides a literature review to identify any limitations or short falls that exist 
in the area of study.  
Chapter II examines the concept of key terrain in physical domains, focusing on 
the concepts use in military operations and the processes and frameworks used to identify 
its existence. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why key terrain is important 
to military operations and planning and create the understanding of key terrain variances 
in other domains. 
Chapter III explores the emergence of cyber as a new war-fighting domain. 
Chapter III provides the introduction to the cyberspace domain, its environment, multi-
layer terrain composition, and the dependence the DOD has on cyberspace to conduct 
military operations. The purpose of this chapter is to identify cyberspace from a military 
perspective and how it is important to U.S. military operations.  
Chapter IV examines the application of the concept of key terrain to the cyber 
domain. This chapter focuses on how cyber key terrain is defined and determines whether 
the concept applies at all, and if so, at which layer(s). Additionally, this chapter examines 
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what key terrain is not and the potential issues or challenges that result from its 
application or lack of application.  
Chapter V concludes with the final assessment of whether or not the concept of 
key terrain adapts to the cyber domain. This chapter summarizes the overall findings of 
the research question and secondary questions. Chapter V recommends any further 
research or areas of study that will assist in the continued understanding of key terrain in 
cyberspace and any policy implications that may arise. 
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II. KEY TERRAIN IN THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
Terrain and weather are neutral; they favor neither side unless one is more 
familiar with—or better prepared to operate in—the physical environment. 
 —Department of the Army (2008, pp. 5–6) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Terrain commonly refers to an area of land and its physical features. The effects, 
advantages, and disadvantages of these physical features are closely examined in order to 
determine the proper military strategies, tactics, and capabilities to achieve success on the 
battlefield. Analysis of the battlespace terrain is essential to military planning as it will 
guide a commander on decisions such as where to maneuver or position forces, where to 
set up communication links, or where logistics routes will be located. In order to answer 
these questions the commander requires an understanding of the physical terrain and the 
overall operational environment. This analysis is necessary regardless of the type of 
mission or area of operations and serves as a critical ingredient to proper mission 
planning and execution.  
Ultimately there are certain terrain features that will stand out, as they provide an 
advantage or are determined as necessary to control in order to succeed with a mission. 
The commander seeks to locate these key terrain features in order to integrate them in to 
the military planning process and secure them to ensure the success of his or her forces. 
“Key terrain” fittingly serves as the term identifying the terrain that yields probable 
advantage and success. Its importance in the military dates back some time and whether 
realized or not the concept has played a part in every major battle. These battles have 
been waged in the physical land, air, and maritime domains. Using key terrain in the 
cyber domain will undoubtedly display some variances to the other domains. A clear 
understanding of key terrain’s history, military importance, and application to the 
physical domains of land, air, sea, and space will provide the foundational understanding 
needed for application to the cyber domain. To understand the term “cyber key terrain” 
one must first understand “key terrain” on its own. 
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B. DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF KEY TERRAIN 
Terrain’s influence on military tactics and strategy is noted as far back as the 
ancient Chinese General Sun Tzu and more recently in the 19th century by the great 
Prussian military strategist, Carl Von Clausewitz. The doctrine of the U.S. military 
heavily adapts the strategies of these notable military strategists, and their teachings 
provide much of the foundational framework upon which U.S. military doctrine is built.  
Clausewitz’s influential work On War dedicates two chapters to terrain. 
Clausewitz describes how “geography and ground can affect military operations in three 
ways: as an obstacle to the approach, as an impediment to visibility, and as cover from 
fire” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 348). Clausewitz saw the potential for using terrain to obstruct 
an enemy’s movement, affect their visibility, and provide protection from attack. Not 
only did Clausewitz acknowledge the importance of terrain and how its understanding 
plays on the battlefield but he also distinguishes that terrain offers advantages to he who 
controls it. Clausewitz describes this advantageous terrain as the “high ground” and cites 
what he calls “three obvious reasons” to the benefits of holding this ground. “First, the 
high ground always inhibits the approach; second shooting downward is perceptibly more 
accurate than shooting upward; and third, heights command a wider view” (Clausewitz, 
1976, p. 352). Clausewitz believed that this high ground was essential to success on the 
battlefield stating, “No army is capable of maintaining a position in the valley of a major 
river if it does not command the surrounding heights” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 354). 
Clausewitz not only saw an advantage from the military tactics perspective but also an 
advantage in regard to the morale of the force that controlled it. Clausewitz believed that 
the superiority and security that one holds by gaining control of the high ground may 
additionally offer more confidence that impresses the mind more acutely than the 
circumstances that modify them, serving as an additional reason to control the high 
ground (Clausewitz, 1976). Clausewitz saw the importance that the high ground 
presented in battle and stresses that it must be analyzed and accounted for when 
implementing strategies of war. His observations serve as the basis of what is known as 
key terrain in U.S. military doctrine today. The DOD has adopted much of Clausewitz’s 
strategy and specifically identifies key terrain in multiple doctrinal publications. 
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C. HOW THE DOD DEFINES KEY TERRAIN 
The Department of Defense defines key terrain as “any area the seizure, retention, 
or control of which affords a marked advantage to either force” (USJCS, 2009, p. II-13). 
It serves as the foundational definition among all the branches of service and is adapted 
within each of their individual doctrinal publications. Their adaptations to key terrain 
have some small alterations but it does not take away from the definition’s meaning. For 
example, the Army and Marine Corps share doctrine on Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield/Battlespace (IPB) which defines key terrain exactly as the DOD with only one 
subtle change using the term “combatant” instead of “force” (Department of the Army, 
U.S. Marine Corps, 2014). The wording of the definition remains similar despite the 
varying environments within the domains because key terrain is generally identified by 
geographic or man-made features making it easy to conceptualize.  
There are considerations that determine when key terrain applies. First, key 
terrain is identified as a result of a mission or operation. Key terrain is a byproduct of the 
military planning process that occurs when there is an operation or desired effect needed. 
Without an operation and the guidance and intent of a commander there is just terrain. 
Second, there must be an adversary or enemy to inflict the desired effects upon. Key 
terrain is considered an advantage to whoever controls it and would imply that there is 
someone else (adversary) to compete for the terrain. Lastly, “key terrain is temporal. It 
changes with the mission and adversary. In the absence of either, these elements may be 
critical infrastructure or a key resource, but not key terrain” (Franz, 2014). Some 
additional considerations for key terrain are outlined in JP 2–01.3:  
 Key terrain varies with the level of command. For example, a large city 
may represent an important objective to an operational-level commander, 
whereas a tactical commander may consider it to be an obstacle. 
 Terrain which permits or denies maneuver, such as bridges or chokepoints, 
may be key terrain. 
 Major obstacles rarely constitute key terrain. Thus, the high ground 
dominating a river, rather than the river itself, is considered key terrain. 
 Key terrain may include areas and facilities that may have an 
extraordinary impact on mission accomplishment (e.g., theater ballistic 
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missile launch facilities, cruise missile launch sites, airfields). (USJCS, 
2009, p. II-14). 
The U.S. Army uses another term called “decisive terrain,” which specifies a type 
of key terrain. According to the Army’s FM 3–90-1, “decisive terrain, when present, is 
key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission 
accomplishment” (Department of the Army, 2013, p. 1–25). Like key terrain, decisive 
terrain is designated by the commander, communicated to the staff, and deemed critical 
as the friendly force must control it in order to successfully accomplish its mission 
(Department of the Army, 2013). While decisive terrain is initially identified as key 
terrain, careful consideration should be used when differentiating the two, as they are not 
exactly the same. 
D. HOW IS KEY TERRAIN IDENTIFIED? 
Key terrain is identified through a process known as terrain analysis. DOD 
doctrinal processes like Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
(JIPOE) and the Army and Marine Corps IPB are examples of commonly used analytical 
processes in which terrain analysis occurs. Terrain analysis is not the end product of 
JIPOE or IPB, but its results fuel the commander’s decision of identifying key terrain and 
will ultimately be communicated to all the staff during operational planning and courses 
of actions (COA) development. In addition to key terrain, terrain analysis may determine 
areas that are obstacles such as swamps, marshes, or dense forest. These areas may hinder 
maneuverability of land forces but may also serve as an area to funnel an adversary or use 
as protection for your flank. Terrain analysis examines the topology and geographic or 
manmade features of an area of operation to provide the vital intelligence needed. This 
ultimately provides the commander with the understanding of the operational 
environment. 
1. Operational Environment 
It is important to understand the operational environment because of its 
significance to decision making on the battlefield. “The operational environment is a 
composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 
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capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” (Department of the Army, 
2008, p. 1–1). Analysis of the operational environment is done using operational and 
mission variables. Army doctrine asserts that its leaders will, “plan, prepare, execute, and 
assess operations by analyzing the operational environment in terms of the operational 
variables and mission variables” (Department of the Army, 2011, p. 2). The operational 
variables help develop a “comprehensive understanding of the operational environment,” 
while mission variables describe the area of operation and how “they might affect a 
mission” (Department of the Army, 2012, p. 1–7, 1–8). The operational environment is 
filtered through each of these variables in order to create situational awareness, 
understanding, and allow for mission refinement. Terrain and the physical environment 
serve as components for both operational and mission variables. 
a. Operational Variables 
Operational variables consist of eight interrelated operation components: political, 
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time 
(PMESII-PT) (Department of the Army, 2012). Each describes objects that influence 
operations and their specific descriptions can be seen in Figure 1. In terms of key terrain 
and terrain analysis the focus is centered on the physical environment variable. The 
physical environment consists of the “geography and man-made structures that reside in 
the operational area” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 1–8). Some of the factors that 
could potentially affect the physical environment identified in FM 3–0, Operations, 
include: 
 Man-made structures, particularly urban areas. 
 Climate and weather. 
 Topography. 
 Hydrology. 
 Natural resources. 
 Biological features and hazards. 
 Other environmental conditions. (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 1–8) 
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FM 3–0 additionally points out that the enemy understands these affects and will 
most likely opt for more complex and challenging terrains to engage in operations. “The 
degree to which each operational variable provides useful information depends on the 
situation and echelon” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 1–9). Operational variables are 
ideal to higher level echelons when planning but are not discarded at the lower levels. 
 
Figure 1.  Operational Variables. 
Source: Department of the Army (2012, p. 1–7). 
b. Mission Variables 
Lower echelons at the tactical level use mission variables, due to their direct 
impact on the mission. These mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and 
weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-
TC) (Department of the Army, 2012). Descriptions for each of these variables are found 
in Figure 2. Focusing on the variable of “terrain,” the intent is to understand the terrain as 
it “directly affects the selection of objectives and the location, movement, and control of 
forces” (Department of Army, 2008, p. 5–6).  
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Figure 2.  Mission Variables. Source: Department of the Army (2012, p. 1–9). 
2. OAKOC 
When examining terrain at the tactical level with the mission variables (METT-
TC) the Army commonly uses the acronym OAKOC. This mnemonic uses five military 
aspects of terrain consisting of: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key 
and decisive terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (Department of the Army, 
2012). When conducting this analysis, it must be done so from the perspective of both the 
friendly and enemy forces. OAKOC is beneficial in that it can be applied on the ground 
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using fundamental skills taught at the lowest levels in the Army. The Joint Publication for 
JIPOE (JP 2–01.3) defines the five military aspects of terrain as follows: 
 Observation and fields of fire— “‘Observation’ is the ability to see (or 
be seen by) the adversary either visually or through the use of surveillance 
devices. A ‘field of fire’ is the area that a weapon or group of weapons 
may effectively cover with fire from a given position” (USJCS, 2009, p. 
II-11). 
 Avenues of approach—“An avenue of approach is a route of an attacking 
force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path” 
(USJCS, 2009, p. II-14). 
 Key terrain—“Key terrain is any area the seizure, retention, or control of 
which affords a marked advantage to either force” (USJCS, 2009, p. II-
13). 
 Obstacles—“Obstacles are obstructions designed or employed to disrupt, 
fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose 
additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. 
Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a combination of both. These can 
include buildings, steep slopes, rivers, lakes, forests, swamps, jungles, 
cities, minefields, trenches, and military wire obstacles. An evaluation of 
obstacles leads to the identification of mobility corridors. This, in turn, 
helps to identify defensible terrain and avenues of approach” (USJCS, 
2009, p. II-11). 
 Cover and Concealment—“‘Concealment’ is protection from 
observation, and can be provided by features such as woods, underbrush, 
snowdrifts, tall grass, and cultivated vegetation. ‘Cover’ is protection from 
direct and indirect fires. It can be provided by such things as ditches, 
caves, tunnels, river banks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, 
walls, and embankments. Areas with good concealment and cover favor 
both offensive and defensive COAs. Since concealment and cover are 
basically the inverse of observation and fields of fire, the analysis of all 
four of these categories should be integrated in order to (a) Identify 
defensible terrain and potential battle positions; (b) Evaluate avenues of 
approach; and (c) Identify potential assembly and dispersal areas” 
(USJCS, 2009, p. II-11). 
When conducting terrain analysis there are many variables to take into account. 
Examining these variables, specifically the variables associated with the terrain and 
physical environment, will guide the identification of key terrain. Thus, far the 
identification process has been focused on the physical domains, but there may be 
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benefits to using terrain analysis tools and frameworks when identifying key terrain in 
cyberspace should the concept prove to be applicable. 
E. KEY TERRAIN COMPARISON AMONG DOMAINS 
When comparing key terrain among the domains there are some subtle differences 
that are the result of their variances in physical environments. Despite the variances 
between the domains, a trend can be seen in regards to certain terrain features that offer 
an advantage during a military operation. There is also a trend for key terrain to exist in 
one domain due to its strategic importance to another domain. This is most commonly 
seen in joint operations and during the D-Day invasion where multiple key terrain 
objectives were selected due to their seizure being necessary for air, naval, and land 
assets. For example, an amphibious assault may be necessary in order to secure a certain 
beachhead that allows land forces to aground or the capture of an airfield may be 
necessary to allow air assets the ability to maneuver.  
There are currently five war fighting domains consisting of land, air, maritime, 
space, and cyberspace. The domains differ in their physical compositions and dimensions 
but they all rely on physical terrain and manifestations when identifying key terrain. 
Cyberspace notably challenges this with its domain’s unique characteristics and will be 
detailed further in Chapter III. Key terrain examples between the various domains 
demonstrates just how its applicability transcends various environments. 
1. Land Domain 
The land domain is the most commonly referenced domain in terms of the 
concept of key terrain. It was the first warfighting domain before man navigated waters, 
skies and outer space. An example of key terrain in the land domain may be a hilltop 
overlooking a known enemy supply route. By positioning forces on the hilltop, certain 
advantages are gained that include cover, concealment, and the ability to observe the 
route. Should engagement with the enemy become necessary, the hilltop allows for 
concentrated fire on the target, and alternately serves as a disadvantage to an enemy 
orchestrating an uphill battle. The land domain also possesses man-made terrain features 
that can serve as key terrain if deemed necessary. An example of a man-made key terrain 
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feature could be a bridge serving as a single point of entry or bottleneck. If the bridge is 
the only point of entry or exit, then control of the bridge may be necessary to execute a 
blockade, prevent retreat, resupply, or reinforcement to the enemy. These two simplistic 
examples demonstrate the concept of key terrain within the land domain. It is important 
to understand that a hilltop or bridge is not key terrain just because it resides in an area of 
operation or battle space, it is considered key terrain because control of the area marks an 
advantage along with the ability to deliver additional desired effects. 
2. Maritime Domain  
The maritime domain consists of “the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, 
islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them” (USJCS, 2009, p. II-16). 
When planning maritime operations, there are certain key aspects that should be 
evaluated in order to identify key terrain from both the friendly and enemy perspectives. 
“Key military aspects of the maritime domain can include maneuver space and 
chokepoints; natural harbors and anchorages; man-made infrastructures; sea lines of 
communications (SLOCs), and ocean surface and subsurface characteristics” (USJCS, 
2009, p. II-16). These key aspects are of importance, as they will help determine where 
potential key terrain may be located. JP2-01.3 offers the following real world examples 
of maritime key terrain; “The Strait of Gibraltar and Suez Canal due to their ability to 
control reinforcement or resupply operations in the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf, 
air bases in Iceland that dominate the North Atlantic shipping lanes in mid-ocean, and 
Diego Garcia which serves as a maritime pre-positioning base to support joint operations 
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf” (USJCS, 2009, p. II-20). 
3. Air Domain 
The air domain is defined as “the operating medium for fixed-wing and rotary-
wing aircraft, air defense systems, unmanned aircraft systems, cruise missiles, and some 
theater and antitheater ballistic missile systems” (USJCS, 2009, p. II-20). Key terrain in 
the air domain is influenced by characteristics on land such as terrain or weather as they 
will influence maneuverability and capabilities of air assets. Therefore, key terrain could 
be any terrain feature that allows for freedom of maneuver and accessibility to targets. An 
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example of key terrain in the air domain could be an opening or divide in a mountainous 
region that allows for maneuverability of rotary wing aircraft to maneuver. As it is known 
that rotatory wing aircraft are not ideal for maneuverability through high elevations or 
urban environments therefore securing a more desired maneuver corridor that will allow 
for air assets to maneuver on the battlefield may be necessary. The airspace over an 
objective or target could additionally be considered key terrain.  
4. Space Domain 
Space is a continuous environment that is the most complex of the physical 
domains. The space domain has some unique characteristics that include: Orbital 
Mechanics, Environmental Considerations, Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) 
Dependency, and No Geographical Boundaries (USJCS, 2013b). The lack of boundaries 
make it difficult to marks borders or areas. Therefore, the physical elements that do reside 
in space present the most likely key terrain, such as satellites or space stations. The lack 
of geographical boundaries is a very similar characteristic that is shared with the cyber 
domain and it is notable that the space domain draws the closest comparison to 
cyberspace in term of challenges, complexity, and uniqueness. 
F. KEY TERRAIN COMPARISON IN LEVELS OF WAR  
Key terrain will vary within the levels of war demonstrating that it changes 
dependent on the operational level and perspective it is being viewed from. The three 
levels of war consist of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (see Figure 3) 
(Department of the Army, 2008). Each level possesses different responsibilities in terms 
of planning; decisions made in one level will directly affect the other levels. The key 
difference between the levels of war is in regard to the operational scale in which the 
commander is tasked. Strategic-level commanders operate at the higher echelons and are 
directing national policy and theater level strategy using national resources. (Department 
of the Army, 2008). “Operational-level commanders typically orchestrate the activities of 
military and other governmental organizations across large areas, while tactical 
commanders focus primarily on employing combined arms within an area of operations” 
(Department of the Army, 2008, p. 6–1, 6–2). Key terrain also changes at each level and 
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reflects upon the objectives of the commander and the desired end state. Using the 
example of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the strategic key terrain objective was seen as the 
countries’ capital Baghdad. Key terrain at the operational level of war could be control of 
an area or route in support of the major operation to seize the capital. Key terrain at the 
tactical level would be more specific, identifying a geographic or manmade feature that is 
decisive to mission accomplishment and ultimately operational and strategic success. 
 
Figure 3.  The Levels of War. Source: Department of the Army (2008, p. 6–2). 
Addressing the levels of war is necessary as the concept of key terrain alters and 
varies between each level of war and must be examined in the correct context. This 
demonstrates how moldable the concept of key terrain becomes when applying it to 
different levels of war and draws similarities to that of cyberspace, in which actions can 
have implications and effects across multiple levels of war. Attention to the levels of war 
is drawn to determine if key terrain will have similar relevancy within the cyber domain.  
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G. CONCLUSION 
From the military perspective, terrain must be analyzed and understood in order to 
leverage potential advantages on the battlefield. Terrain analysis is vital to military 
operational planning as it helps the commander understand the operational environment 
and identify key terrain. Key terrain is deemed important to the U.S. military for the pure 
fact that its possession can be the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield. 
The teachings of Clausewitz along with lessons learned on the battlefield have shaped the 
importance of key terrain in U.S. military doctrine. In the Army, reference and use of the 
concept of key terrain starts with Troop Leading Procedures, at the lowest echelon of 
leadership (Company and Below). At this echelon, soldiers, from the company to the 
squad level, are exposed to the concept as they analyze the effects that terrain may have 
on the mission. This early exposure has resulted in a strong grasp of the concept in terms 
of the land domain. 
This chapter outlined the foundational importance of the concept of key terrain. 
The focus thus far has been in the physical domains of land, air, and maritime. The next 
chapter transitions to the cyber domain, the focus of this thesis. With the foundational 
understanding of key terrain, it is evident that some critical points must be accounted for 
in the assessment of its applicability to cyberspace. These critical points include 
maintaining the correct operational context and ensuring that the terrain feature aligns 








The emergence of cyberspace has drastically changed the daily lives of everyone 
in the world. Ideas once viewed as futuristic or impossible are now reality; with the 
ability to communicate and collaborate with people via electronic mail, transmit currency 
via the Internet, or view satellite imagery from anywhere in the world. These capabilities 
and many more are made possible due to cyberspace. Cyberspace is an environment that 
is purely man-made and consists of both physical and non-physical attributes. The 
environment of cyberspace offers challenges and complexities unseen in other 
warfighting domain and requires extra attention when applying the traditional concept of 
key terrain.  
The DOD highly depends on cyberspace to support operations with heavy use of 
IT infrastructure and systems supporting intelligence, logistics, and command and control 
functions. This chapter specifically examines the question of what cyberspace is, and how 
it is important to the military. Answering this question along with outlining the unique 
characteristics of the cyber domain are necessary prior to application of key terrain. 
B. WHAT IS CYBERSPACE? 
Cyberspace is the ‘place’ where a telephone conversation appears to 
occur. Not inside your actual phone, the plastic device on your desk. Not 
inside the other person’s phone, in some other city. The place between the 
phones. The indefinite place out there, where the two of you, two human 
beings, actually meet and communicate. (Sterling, 1992) 
“Cyberspace is simply the manmade domain and information environment we 
create when we connect together all computers, wires, switches, routers, wireless devices, 
satellites, and other components that allow us to move large amounts of data at very fast 
speeds” (Williams, 2014, p. 14). All the interconnected devices and data that comprise 
cyberspace are manmade, from the IT infrastructure to the software, protocols, and 
resident data, all are created by man. The DOD defines cyberspace as an information 
environment “consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology 
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infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, 
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers” (USJCS, 2013a, p. I-1). 
This inherently means that cyberspace not only consists of end user systems and physical 
devices, but also the resident data as well as the interaction with this data that occurs in 
an abstract environment. This definition also presents the fact that the Internet is included 
as a comprising piece of cyberspace. The unique traits that distinguish cyberspace from 
other domains are its lack of physical characteristics, and its susceptibility to rapid 
changes that effectively alter its terrain or configuration. 
1. Nonphysical Qualities of Cyberspace 
Many of the objects and identities that exist within cyberspace are nonphysical, in 
that they lack any geospatial locations resulting in no ties to any physical location. In the 
land domain, fixed terrain features such as mountains, depressions, or valleys are tied to a 
geographic location. Cyberspace does not have this luxury. Instead the terrain includes 
objects such as “radio waves, cell phones, fiber optic cables, satellites, laser beams, 
software, firmware, and anything that can be linked together to create a network” 
(Magee, 2013, p. 77). The cyber terrain however does contain IT infrastructure, systems 
and communication mediums that exist in the physical domains but function in the 
cyberspace environment. These objects can be potentially fixed to one physical location 
but this is not guaranteed. These objects can be physically moved, reconfigured or 
logically altered in some way. The nonphysical characteristic of cyberspace is seen with 
the use of IP addresses. Addresses in the physical domain reference a physical location 
however, addressing in the context of IP addresses tells the user where to go, but it does 
not necessarily translate to its physical location. 
2. Dynamic Environment  
The element of human control and interaction in cyberspace allow for the 
environment to be highly malleable. Elements of cyberspace can be easily altered, added, 
or removed, resulting in constant changes to the topology of the terrain. These changes 
occur at profound speeds, which essentially means the landscape of cyberspace at this 
moment does not guarantee the same landscape the very next second. For example, minor 
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configuration changes to a wireless access point can have large implications on the 
overall layout of a network. If an access point with ten connected nodes is removed, the 
nodes become inaccessible changing the topology of the network. The human interaction 
with cyber identities such as email accounts, social media, and blogs also account for 
elements of cyberspace and are subject to change. This human interaction will result in 
the addition of data or the removal of data from cyberspace.  
The fact that the environment of cyberspace is constantly growing and changing 
also results in a vast domain. After all, “cyberspace consists of many different and often 
overlapping networks, as well as the nodes (any device or logical location with an 
Internet protocol address or other analogous identifier) on those networks, and the system 
data (such as routing tables) that support them” (USJCS, 2013a, p. I-2). This 
demonstrates how large cyberspace is and continues to grow with various projections 
forecasting 30–50 billion devices to be connected to the Internet over the next 10 years. 
In addition, the rise of the Internet of Things (IOT) along with the transition to IPV6 
support the fact that cyberspace is growing at an exponential rate and will continue to 
grow with no sign of slowing down. 
C. CYBER TERRAIN COMPOSITION: THREE LAYERS 
“The U.S. Army LANDCYBER White Paper 2018–2030,” defines cyberspace 
terrain as the “Physical and non-physical terrain created by and/or composed of the 
human layer, logical layer, and physical layer” (U.S. Army Cyber Command, 2013, p. 
46). JP 3–12 does not define cyberspace terrain anywhere in its publication but does 
describe a layered approach that decomposes cyberspace. Due to the unique terrain traits, 
it is understandable why many, including the DOD, divide cyberspace into multiple 
layers when discussing its terrain.  
The DOD depicts cyberspace in three layers: physical network, logical network, 
and cyber-persona (USJCS, 2013a). Each of these layers represents a different grouping 
of objects and identities that reside in that specific layer.  
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Figure 4.  The Three Layers of Cyberspace. Source: USJCS (2013a, p. I-3). 
The two components of the physical network layer include the geographic and 
physical network components. The geographic components are the physical location of 
the infrastructure, and systems that support cyberspace. They have the ability to not 
remain fixed in one location as discussed in the previous subsection. The physical 
network components are the media through which data travels and are “comprised of the 
hardware, systems software, and infrastructure (wired, wireless, cabled links, EMS links, 
satellite, and optical) that supports the network and the physical connectors (wires, 
cables, radio frequency, routers, switches, servers, and computers)” (USJCS, 2013a, p. I-
3). The physical network layer shares a relationship with the physical domains in that its 
infrastructure and objects operate in their domains. The physical layer is the easiest to 
understand as it shares similarities to the terrain principles of physical domains.  
The logical network layer is abstract in that it encompasses various elements such 
as software, operating systems, system data, and protocols all of which allow the 
exchange of information in cyberspace to be possible. These elements are related in an 
abstract manner from the physical layer but are not tied to an individual, specific path, or 
node (USJCS, 2013a). An example of this could be a website URL. The URL’s address is 
used to route the user to a website’s server. The URL identifies the website but it does not 
identify a physical location as the web servers may be located in multiple physical 
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locations. At this layer one can begin to see potential challenges to applying key terrain in 
cyberspace.  
“The cyber-persona layer represents yet a higher level of abstraction of the logical 
network in cyberspace; it uses the rules that apply in the logical network layer to develop 
a digital representation of an individual or entity identity in cyberspace. … However, one 
individual may have multiple cyber-persona, … [and a] single cyber-persona can have 
multiple users” (USJCS, 2013a, p. I-3, I-4). Digital representations include: email, social 
media, phone numbers, or web presences that can be tied to an individual or group. Cyber 
personas are a common trend among people all over the world with approximately 2.3 
billion social media users active today. Using Facebook as an example, it is possible for 
one user to create multiple user accounts or link their account to other social media 
accounts and emails, resulting in multiple cyber personas. Additionally, users may share 
a cyber persona, as is seen with social media accounts for organizations in which multiple 
people access the same account, sharing information and data. Cyber personas can also 
include administrative level accounts on a system or network, which serve as high value 
targets to opposing forces. The cyber persona layer is abstract and complex in the fact 
that elements will reside in many virtualized locations and will rarely be linked to a 
centralized location. This again demonstrates a potential challenge for key terrain 
application in the cyber domain. 
D. DOD AND CYBERSPACE 
The Internet is the most notable network that resides in cyberspace. Many may 
simply define cyberspace as the Internet or vice versa, but the Internet is just one entity of 
cyberspace. The Internet originates back to the 1960s when the U.S. Government 
commissioned research to develop computer networks in order to share information 
between various military research facilities. The research gained the interest of academia 
intrigued with the idea of sharing data and information with fellow universities. The 
progression in research resulted in the development of the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency Network (ARPANET), which was an early packet switching network and the 
first network to use the TCP/IP protocol (“Internet,” n.d.). This introduced the ability for 
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networks to connect to other networks, allowing one location to exchange and share 
information with another physical location. With continued research, funding, and 
advances in technology, the Internet is now a global system of interconnected computer 
networks that link a wide variety of devices together (“Internet,” n.d.). Some of these 
devices include computers, mobile phones, and tablets, but more recently everyday 
objects such as thermostats, refrigerators, televisions, and automobiles are becoming 
connected devices, making up the “Internet of Things.” Governments, banks, and 
societies all over the world now rely on the functions and capabilities that the Internet 
provides, thus solidifying the importance that cyberspace holds today. 
The reliance and importance of cyberspace is no different for the U.S. military. 
Cyberspace benefits the DOD in many ways and now has become fully integrated into 
almost every aspect of the military. The DOD’s original requirements to simply share 
data between research facilities and installations has dramatically expanded. The military 
is now heavily dependent on cyberspace to conduct day-to-day operations and support 
warfighting functions. The DOD relies on cyberspace to enable functions such as 
logistics, global command and control of forces, intelligence, and remote operations 
(Lynn, 2010). Common everyday functions such as electronic mail and 
telecommunications are the most notable cyberspace uses of the military, but systems 
such as the Army’s Standard Army Maintenance System—Enhanced (SAMS-E) and the 
Blue Force Tracker (BFT) are examples of technologies that are now viewed as essential 
to those that use them.  
SAMS-E allows for the U.S. Army to order and track over 1 million vehicle and 
repair parts in an expedited manner permitting high levels of readiness (McLane 
Advanced Technologies, n.d.). It is now a common fixture within Army units with 
commanders relying on it to maintain unit readiness and effectiveness. The BFT is an 
example of a command and control or mission command system that is heavily relied on 
by ground forces providing real-time location updates using GPS, instant messaging, and 
IP-capable networking to mobile air and ground platforms (ViaSat, n.d.). Recent conflicts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the benefits that the BFT provides the 
warfighter by allowing units real-time tracking of friendly forces, movements, and 
 37
additional contingency communication capabilities all from an embedded console in their 
vehicle.  
Both technologies are extremely beneficial to the warfighter and it is important to 
note that the supporting infrastructure and data that allow for its functionality resides in 
cyberspace. These systems network with other systems and databases in order to 
communicate needed supplies or communicate positioning of Soldiers on the ground. 
While the infrastructure may physically reside in another domain (land, air, maritime, or 
space), it all functions and interacts in cyberspace. Cyberspace allows for efficiency in 
the military as tasks are now able to be completed in quicker periods of time. The DOD 
has pushed for “net-centric operations based on digital communications and ease of 
access to information at all levels, down to the individual soldier on the battlefield” 
(Arquilla & Goldman, 2014). This benefit along with the ultimate ability to communicate 
makes cyberspace instrumental to the success of the U.S. military. With the use of 
cyberspace and its benefits come threats and vulnerabilities. 
1. Emergence of Cyber Warfighting Domain 
With the great benefits cyberspace offers to the military there are also risks and 
threats to its functionality, which have great implications on military operations. Like 
other warfighting domains, cyberspace is not free of malicious actors with the intent of 
taking advantage of vulnerabilities or do harm. Nation states, hacktivist, and script 
kiddies are at the forefront of attacks in cyberspace and the DOD’s presence in 
cyberspace is a highly sought after target. Between September 2014 and June 2015, the 
DOD acknowledged that it had endured 30 million malicious intrusions on DOD 
networks (Department of Defense [Memorandum], 2015). While only a small percentage 
were actually successful, these threats and vulnerabilities now require defensive measures 
in order to protect people, data, and IT infrastructure from the risk of physical, economic, 
or media damage. 
The potential for cyberspace to be used with the intent to destroy, disrupt, deny, 
or degrade an enemy’s resources or operations demonstrated the potential for a new form 
of warfare. This realization, along with the need to secure critical data and infrastructure 
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fueled the efforts that eventually allowed cyberspace to be recognized as a domain. To 
better scale efforts to protect DOD in cyberspace, then Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
ordered the consolidation of task forces into a newly formed U.S. Cyber Command 
(Lynn, 2010). Led by a four-star commander, they would begin operations in May 2010 
as a sub unified command of U.S. Strategic Command (Lynn, 2010).  
Recognizing that cyberspace possesses the attributes of a space in which warfare 
could occur, the DOD recognized the cyber domain. This independent domain only 
marginally resembles the other domains, as the cyber domain introduces an environment 
filled with non-physical attributes, logical data, and user personas. The terrain of the 
cyber domain challenges current doctrine, processes, and strategies of warfare. Retired 
General Keith B. Alexander reiterated this point stating, “While the time-tested principles 
of war will ultimately apply in cyberspace, its characteristics are so radically different 
that they demand significant innovation and changes to the way we organize and conduct 
military operations and tactics in this domain” (Alexander, 2007, p. 59). 
2. DOD Cyberspace Operations 
The DOD defines cyberspace operations as “the employment of cyberspace 
capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace” 
(USJCS, 2013a, p. II-1). Cyberspace operations are “those conducted in cyberspace with 
the objective of providing friendly freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and projecting 
power in and through the domain in support of JFC campaign objectives” (Williams, 
2014, p. 14). Cyberspace operations are categorized by their intent and are identified as 
offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), or 
DOD Information Network operations (DODIN-Ops).  
Offensive cyberspace operations are operations in which the intent is “to project 
power by the application of force in and through cyberspace” (USJCS, 2013a, p. II-2). 
Defensive cyberspace operations are operations in which the intent is “to defend DOD or 
other friendly cyberspace” using active and passive cyberspace operational measures 
(USJCS, 2013a, II-2). DCO is important as it is most likely occurring inside a friendly 
network and includes activities such as hardening of systems and hunting for threats. 
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“DODIN operations are actions taken to design, build, configure, secure, operate, 
maintain, and sustain DOD communications systems and networks in a way that creates 
and preserves data availability, integrity, confidentiality, as well as user/entity 
authentication and non-repudiation” (USJCS, 2013a, II-3). DODIN-ops support and 
protect the vast needs and daily operational services that the DOD is reliant on. This 
includes IT platforms, service and agency networks, industrial control systems, mobile 
devices, and tactical communication systems that all support the DOD (Daniel, 2016). 
Cyberspace operations provide freedom of movement through cyberspace, they 
can deny the enemy freedom of maneuver, and can explicitly support campaign or 
mission objectives. They have purpose and are executed with careful planning similar to 
that of the other domains. Understanding the operational environment still applies in 
cyberspace and IPB is still conducted to help understand the terrain, which includes 
identification of key terrain. 
E. COMPARISON OF CYBERSPACE TO OTHER DOMAINS 
When comparing the cyber domain to the other domains there are some noticeable 
observations. First, cyberspace is dependent on other domains to operate and has certain 
interdependencies with specific domains. Second, the cyber domain is borderless. Last, 
maneuverability within the domain is unlike that in any of the other domains. Discussion 
of these key points along with others will draw the similarities and differences between 
the domains. This is imperative to gaining insight into potential challenges or similarities 
cyber has to other domains when trying to apply the concept of key terrain. 
1. Cyber Dependencies 
Understanding the cyber terrain alerts us to the unique relationships and 
differences the cyber domain shares with the land, air, maritime, and space domains. 
Cyberspace relies on the fact that the physical devices, nodes, and infrastructure that 
support it, all reside in the other warfighting domains. Examples range from satellites in 
space, underwater cables in the ocean providing a backbone for communication between 
nations, or antennas on top of buildings, all of which exist in other domains but function 
in the cyber domain. This is seen with the unique relationship between space and 
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cyberspace in that “virtually all space operations are dependent on cyberspace, and a 
critical portion of cyberspace can only be provided via space operations” (USJCS, 2013a, 
p. I-2).  
 
Figure 5.  Domain Interaction. Source: Welsh (2011, p. 3). 
Welch’s figure shown in Figure 5 demonstrates how cyberspace is embedded into 
all the other domains. Cyberspace must interact and is highly dependent on each domain 
to function. “Military operations in all domains depend on operations in, through, and 
from cyberspace” (Welsh, 2011, p. 3). 
2. Borderless Environment 
Cyberspace has no definitive borders like the other domains. The transactions, 
and data exchanges occur within cyberspace and circulate through devices such as routers 
and servers all over the globe. Identifying ownership of cyberspace is impossible purely 
on the basis of its composition and functionality. As discussed earlier, there are no 
physical ties to locations making the ability to map areas of responsibility or ownership 
difficult. “The ubiquitous nature of cyberspace creates another major consideration in CO 
[cyber operations], because it enables an adversary to establish key points of presence 
outside the physical operating area” (USJCS, 2013a, p. II-10). This ultimately means that 
there is no definitive battlespace or area of operations in cyberspace. Cyber operations are 
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not restricted to one particular area and an enemy can attack from anywhere, which is 
unseen in any of the other domains.  
However, there is some similarity between cyberspace and space when it comes 
to borders. Neither has definitive borders that can be drawn and enforced. The maritime 
domain also presents some challenges in this sense, but agreements among nations have 
politically determined borders that outline national and international waters. Cyberspace 
however does not allow for lines to be drawn in the sand making the identification of 
friendly cyberspace versus non-friendly cyberspace impossible. 
3. Maneuverability in Cyberspace 
The cyber domain’s malleable environment affects maneuverability within the 
cyber domain. When the stage is set for a battle in the land domain an area will be 
selected for engagement and the means of getting to that area will be planned. This is not 
the case in the cyber domain. There is no set area for engagement and the route to a target 
can change in the blink of an eye as the enemy has the potential to change the 
configuration of the battlefield at any time, making maneuverability a challenge.  
In addition, like other domains maneuverability during military operations must 
account for legality, sovereignty, and political considerations. However, the lack of 
definition or agreement on these considerations in cyberspace equates to greater 
challenges when addressing these topics. Legalities of warfare in the cyber domain 
remain in development and there is a large disparity among nations on how these should 
be addressed. The Tallinn Manual is working toward the discussion and establishment of 
such legalities but still requires worldwide acceptance. Sovereignty is challenged by the 
borderless environment possessed by cyberspace in which data circulates through routers, 
switches, and servers that are housed in various physical locations and physical devices. 
Sovereignty and ownership of cyberspace exudes the issue of attribution in cyberspace. 
Determining threats and identifying those responsible for attacks in cyberspace presents 
another difference within the cyber domain. Within cyberspace, attacks require more 
forensics and intelligence to attribute their true source. Adversaries in cyberspace are 
afforded abilities, unseen in the physical domains, to obscure their identity. These 
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challenges demonstrate more of the key functional differences that the cyber domain 
presents. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The cyber domain is vital as it houses all the technologies and systems that the 
military relies on to function. It has emerged as a warfighting domain and the application 
of military strategies and tactics is required to support cyberspace operations. There are 
considerations that have been derived from this chapter that must be accounted for when 
analyzing key terrain’s application in cyberspace. These considerations include the 
nonphysical characteristics of cyberspace, the dynamic environment of cyberspace, and 
the absence of borders, which influence maneuverability. Lastly, we discover that 
cyberspace is dependent on other domains for functionality, which could potentially 
mean that key terrain could exist in other domains but directly affect the cyber domain. 
An additional set of considerations that must be tested is the three-layer composition of 
cyberspace. This unique terrain composition must be tested against the concept of key 
terrain to understand how the concept relates at each layer. These considerations can 
potentially influence where key terrain resides in cyberspace and how it can be found. 
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IV. KEY TERRAIN AND CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Outlining the importance of the concept of key terrain and the emergence of the 
cyber domain allows for an assessment of if or how the concept of key terrain fits in 
cyberspace. Prior to making this assessment correct terms and contexts must be applied 
by clarifying what is not key terrain. Walking the concept through each layer of 
cyberspace, including all considerations, while using correct terminology and contexts 
should allow for an answer to the research question posed by this thesis. Additionally, the 
considerations outlined in the previous chapter must be represented in order to determine 
if they influence the application of key terrain. This chapter concludes with that 
assessment on whether the unique challenges and layers of cyberspace require a cyber-
specific definition.  
B. WHAT CYBER KEY TERRAIN IS NOT 
There are other military and private sector vocabulary terms that bear similarities 
to the concept of key terrain but are inherently different. The definitions of these terms 
share some similarities to key terrain but they differ in the context of operations. 
Examining these terms filters out the misconceptions that interfere with key terrain’s 
application to cyberspace. These terms are not the same as key terrain: 
 Crown Jewels—”a process for identifying those cyber assets that are most 
critical to the accomplishment of an organization’s mission” (MITRE, 
n.d., para. 1 (definition)). 
 Critical Asset - “A specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance 
that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, 
debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function 
effectively” (USJCS, 2010, p. 55). 
 Critical Infrastructure - “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 
those matters” (U.S. Patriot Act of 2001). 
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Crown jewels analysis or CJA accounts for the fact that not every cyber asset can 
be configured and designed to withstand any APT. Instead CJA identifies mission critical 
assets ensuring that those cyber dependent assets are designed and configured to 
withstand APTs. Using this type of analysis can scope a large network down to a smaller 
group of assets in which resources and additional security efforts can be placed. This type 
of analysis fits in the context of risk management or threat modeling, where critical assets 
need to be identified and protected, but differs from key terrain in a few aspects. In 
cyberspace, key terrain looks for objects in the layers of cyberspace that would afford an 
advantage if seized. CJA is looking for cyber assets that are critical to mission 
accomplishment and the organization’s ability to operate. CJA is strictly from a defender 
point of view and is purely focused on looking at the cyber assets internal to the defender. 
While penetration testers take an attacker perspective it is still not in the same context as 
a military cyber operation. 
Critical assets focus on entities that if lost would severely hurt the nations’ ability 
to function. This is an internal organizational view to identifying critical assets owned by 
the organization or unit. These assets are prioritized into a list called a “critical asset list” 
which the DOD defines as “a prioritized list of assets or areas, normally identified by 
phase of the operation and approved by the joint force commander, that should be 
defended against air and missile threats” (USJCS, 2010, p. 55). The “critical asset list” 
prioritizes the critical assets while the “defended asset list” prioritizes the defense of 
these assets with the resources available (USJCS, 2010). Key terrain maintains a more 
offensive and defensive operational context while critical assets focuses more on the 
overall operation. Critical assets are viewed mostly as internal assets that are critical and 
must be defended in order to sustain the nation’s ability to function. 
Another common misconception is that critical infrastructure and key terrain are 
the same. With the prevalence of IT systems and architecture dominating the operational 
functions of critical services and needs, it is understandable how one could mislabel the 
two. Careful differentiation must be placed between critical infrastructure and key terrain, 
as they are not the same. Like critical assets, critical infrastructure is examined from a 
more defensive posture. Critical infrastructure is seen as vital to the U.S. livelihood. 
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Analysis to find critical infrastructure is done as a preemptive effort to identify systems 
and assets to harden and protect. Conversely, key terrain is looking for similar assets but 
with the intention of exploitation or protection in a military cyberspace operation. There 
is the potential for certain cyber critical infrastructures to be identified as key terrain if it 
pertained to a cyber operation and afforded an advantage to that operation. However, 
critical infrastructure is very broad and its association to national security and livelihood 
imply that it is a target to be cautious of as it has great ramifications. It is understandable 
to identify a power station as critical infrastructure but to label it as cyber key terrain is 
too broad. Key terrain in cyberspace is more specific, and would need to identify a 
specific cyber entity that fit in the cyberspace layers. For example, rather than the power 
station, cyber key terrain could be a SCADA network entry point. This is very similar to 
the “sensor to shooter” concept in which analysis must be conducted to find the specific 
points of entry and vulnerabilities to exploit. Thus, critical infrastructure is important to 
identify and protect but differs from the concept of key terrain. 
There are definitional similarities between CJA, critical assets and critical 
infrastructure which undoubtedly causes some to use them interchangeably. It is not 
uncommon for companies and organizations in the private sector to use or adapt military 
terminology but key terrain is only identified and applied to military operations. The 
private sector is focused on cyber security and defensive activities to protect the assets 
that are vital to their organizations and are not conducting offensive and defensive cyber 
operations like the DOD. Establishing this clear difference does not negate the usefulness 
of these terms in cyberspace and is more focused on ensuring the correct terminology is 
used when applying key terrain to cyberspace.  
C. APPLYING KEY TERRAIN TO THE LAYERS OF CYBERSPACE 
As discussed in the previous chapter the DOD divides cyberspace into three 
layers. There may be certain layers in cyberspace where key terrain applies better than 
others. Understanding the layers and what key terrain elements exist will ultimately 
determine if the concept adapts to cyberspace. When examining each layer the 
perspective of a military cyber operation must be maintained in order to keep the correct 
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context. The following discussion examines considerations for key terrain at each layer, 
examples of what key terrain might be identified at that layer, where it breaks down, and 
what changes to the application of key terrain may be required.  
1. Key Terrain at the Physical Layer 
Applying the concept of key terrain to the physical network layer aligns with the 
concept’s traditional use. This is because elements at the physical layer exist in the other 
physical domains and can potentially be tied to a geographic location, though some have 
the ability to move or change. This layer includes the geographic and physical network 
components necessary for networks to function. Geographic components physically 
reside in the land, maritime, air, and space domains. Physical components such as the 
infrastructure, computers, and wiring also reside in the physical domains. This is the only 
layer in which humans can physically interact with components. For example, a wire can 
be unplugged or a router physically moved. 
Applying key terrain at the physical network layer requires analysis of physical 
and geographic components in an area of operation. This analysis will yield a map of 
certain cyber terrain elements that are of advantage to whomever controls them. For 
example, key terrain at the physical layer could be a vulnerable wireless medium that 
controls traffic infrastructure in an area of operation. While conducting a study, a group 
of researchers was able to access the wireless communication of a traffic system’s 
network through vulnerabilities in encryption, and use of default usernames and 
passwords (Ghena, Beyer, Hillaker, Pevarnek, Halderman, 2014). This could be 
identified as key terrain if the intent was to cause a disruption or alter the traveling path 
of a moving target. The poor security posture of a physical wireless medium is an 
example of using a physical network layer object as key terrain.  
Another physical layer key terrain example is the actual physical wires and cables 
carrying data across a nation. In September of 2015, the FBI investigated the severing of 
two AT&T fiber-optic cables that supported a large spoke of area communications 
infrastructure in San Francisco, California (Howell, 2015). The high-capacity lines carry 
vast amounts of data including voice communications and computer transactions making 
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them appealing key terrain targets (Howell, 2015). This specific incident disrupted seven 
911 call centers (Chu, 2016). These cables span the globe, including traversing the 
oceans. In the maritime domain, most underwater sea cables are cut within a few miles of 
shore and are easy to repair but cutting cables at further depths out in the middle of the 
ocean could potentially cripple communications for some time (Sanger, Schmitt, 2015). 
This demonstrates that even a specific portion of cable could be considered key terrain 
based on the advantage it would provide. 
The concept of key terrain has the potential to break down at this level because of 
the ability for physical layer elements to move. Some objects at this layer will be fixed to 
a geographic location but most will not due to their mobility and their ability to be 
physically configured or moved by humans, as presented in the example of the cut fiber 
lines. The mobility of objects at the physical layer presents a challenge when identifying 
key terrain as it could exist at one moment and gone the next. This will require additional 
care when identifying physical layer elements as key terrain. Key terrain at this layer can 
be identified by mapping and understanding physical infrastructure and mediums of a 
network. Persistent monitoring methods will have to be introduced into the planning 
processes of military operations to ensure geographic and physical components of this 
layer have not moved. 
2. Key Terrain at the Logical Layer 
The logical network layer of cyberspace introduces the first of the non-physical 
layers. The objects in this layer have no geographical location and are not necessarily tied 
to a specific node. The logical layer is everything between the communication mediums 
and systems of the physical layer. Interactions at the logical layer include protocols 
telling packets of data where to go, the machine code telling a computer how to process 
data, and the DNS server resolving web addresses to their respective IP addresses. 
Applying the concept of key terrain to the logical layer requires more thought 
than is required of physical terrain. Key terrain at this level could be a logical port in 
which control is necessary to launch exploits or tools. Control of a port could be relatable 
to controlling a bridge in the physical domain. Control allows for monitoring or the 
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ability to stop network traffic into and out of that logical port. Logical ports associate IP 
addresses and protocols and as the name implies they themselves are logical and have no 
physical presence or location.  
The 2008 Russian Georgian War provides an example, indicating likely 
identification of key terrain in order to achieve cyber effects. This war was the first time a 
conflict witnessed cyberspace being used in synchronization for combat actions with 
other warfighting domains (Hollis, 2011). The Russians launched a series of DDoS 
attacks on Georgian networks denying communications and simultaneously conducted 
information exfiltration activities to collect intelligence (Hollis, 2011). website and 
hacker forum defacement was conducted for propaganda and counter-attack mitigation 
measures (Hollis, 2011). These actions demonstrate that the Russians most likely 
identified certain cyber features as key terrain, in this case websites and forums. They 
gained access to these sites by exploiting poor security measures, possibly through SQL 
code injection or cross-site scripting attacks, and denied access and altered data. In order 
to deny access to websites using DDoS attacks, the Russians would need to identify ports 
and IP addresses (logical layer elements) as key terrain due to their control being 
necessary to facilitate the desired effects. This historical example does not explicitly label 
key terrain but it does imply that the Russians had selected specific cyber terrain that 
would support their operations. 
Key terrain at the logical layer can potentially break down due to the care that 
must be placed in its identification. Identification of key terrain at the logical layer will 
require enumeration and scanning of the area of operations in cyberspace. This provides 
vital intelligence needed to map the nonphysical network such as information on 
operating systems, configurations, and logical addresses. There is the potential for logical 
layer terrain to change, which hinders the ability to capture an accurate depiction of the 
layer. As discussed in Chapter 3, terrain in the logical layers can be reconfigured and 
change moment to moment. This will again require continued monitoring throughout the 
operational planning process in order to ensure the key terrain still exists. An additional 
challenge is how to define control in the logical layer. Applying a concept like key terrain 
would imply that the retention and control of a logical layer element would allow an 
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advantage during operations. However, the ability to actually control or retain a logical 
layer element could be considered unmeasurable. If you mount forces on a hill they can 
generate an assessment of its control by visual observation. In cyberspace and 
specifically the logical layer this assessment is not as easy to measure. Logical layer 
elements can have multiple users at one time with neither realizing they are there. 
3. Key Terrain at the Cyber-persona Layer 
The cyber-persona layer is another non-physical layer and encompasses the cyber 
identities that most notably include email accounts, administrator accounts, and social 
media accounts. Possession of these accounts would yield great advantage to whomever 
controlled it and could be identified as key terrain should its control be necessary to 
achieve an operational outcome. Therefore, key terrain at the cyber persona layer will 
often be user accounts.  
In January 2015, hackers claiming loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) compromised Twitter and YouTube accounts owned by USCENTCOM. Twitter, a 
popular social media service and YouTube, a site that hosts user video content, were both 
used by USCENTCOM as effective communication tools for the media, service 
members, and families. The hackers defaced the Twitter account by adding messages 
such as “American soldiers, we are coming, watch your back. ISIS.” and “We broke into 
your networks and personal devices and know everything about you. You’ll see no mercy 
infidels. ISIS is already here, we are in your PCs, in each military base” (ZeroFOX, 2015, 
para. 2–3). The hackers then claimed to have obtained “classified” information from 
these accounts and threatened to disseminate various PII to include names, phone 
numbers, an email addresses of military personnel. (ZeroFOX, 2015). The compromise of 
these accounts was short lived but their ability to gain access and control of 
USCENTCOM’s social media accounts demonstrated a cyber persona layer key terrain 
from an enemy’s standpoint. The act was labeled cyber vandalism but it did allow the 
enemy to alter messages of a combatant command which could have potentially degraded 
the mission, hurt morale, or compromised sensitive data housed on these sites.  
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Key terrain at the cyber persona layer can potentially break down for two reasons. 
First, accounts can change and adversaries can hold many accounts. This requires the 
careful monitoring that is necessary of the previous two layers. Second, there remains an 
issue with the term “control.” How one would control a cyber persona is hard to judge. 
For example, users may not notice that their email account is compromised until they see 
unfamiliar messages in their sent items outbox. However, the cyber persona can be 
seized, and does not degrade its usefulness as long as the realization is made while 
applying key terrain at this layer. Contingency key terrain should be selected due to the 
volatility of the terrain at this layer. 
A concluding point that applies to all the layers is the fact that key terrain 
identification will vary based on who is looking at it. The application of key terrain in the 
cyberspace layers is necessarily subjective, although it should not be arbitrary. Two 
commanders can look at the same operation and based on the current state of the 
environment and the intelligence on hand, select two different cyber key terrains. It is not 
unfathomable for someone to look at each of the examples and identify different points of 
access or cyber identities that would meet the definition of key terrain for the given 
context of a mission or operation. Therefore, careful attention must be given to utilizing 
the concept of key terrain in cyberspace, especially when applying it to non-physical 
layers, as these tend to be the most volatile and abstract. Based on this assessment and the 
nonphysical layers of cyberspace one may question if there is indeed a need for cyber 
specific terminology to define concepts like key terrain in cyberspace.  
D. IS A DOCTRINAL CYBER-SPECIFIC KEY TERRAIN DEFINITION 
NEEDED? 
As acknowledged in the literature review, there is currently no definition for 
cyber key terrain in military doctrine. JP 3–12 references cyber key terrain when 
discussing movement and maneuver, stating that the concept of key terrain is essential to 
planning. The DOD uses one standard definition for key terrain when defining it 
throughout all domains as found in each service’s doctrinal publications. Focusing on the 
cyber domain, JP 3–12 presents some broad examples of what objects or features in 
cyberspace may be identified as key terrain to include, “…major lines of 
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communications; key access points for the defense, observation, and launch points for the 
offense; or opportunities to create bottlenecks” (USJCS, 2013a, II-10). This is a broad 
overview of potential cyber terrain features, but does not serve as a definition that can be 
used to define cyber key terrain. At first glance the absence of a cyber key terrain 
definition may appear to be an oversight or flaw in doctrine. This however may not be the 
case as there are no other domains with a specific key terrain definition. The concept’s 
application should not be hindered by the absence of a doctrinal cyber-specific definition 
nor should it cause confusion. There are three reasons why a cyber-specific key terrain 
definition is not needed.  
First, based on the organic and constantly changing environment of cyberspace, 
no clear cyber key terrain definition can be given, because what would apply today does 
not apply tomorrow. The steady advancement of technology additionally affects the 
terrain of cyberspace. This unstable terrain creates a moving target that is hard to place a 
fixed definition on. The volatility of key terrain at each of the layers of cyberspace 
additionally demonstrates this problem.  
Second, doctrinal strategies and processes are already in place. Efforts to build a 
cyber-specific definition for a concept that would equate or mean the same thing as key 
terrain would not be valuable. Understanding the operational environment is a 
requirement in military planning regardless of the domain and the use of traditional 
military concepts such as key terrain help to alleviate misunderstandings. Applying the 
concept to cyberspace generates specific viewpoints that military leaders regardless of 
their background can understand. Using the term “key terrain” is productive in the fact 
that it is understood in the military vocabulary and would ensure commanders are 
involved and interested in the cyber planning (Williams, 2014). Maintaining a common 
understanding is essential to effectiveness of integrating combatant commands and cyber 
assets for operational planning. 
Third, other domains do not establish domain specific definitions for key terrain, 
but do provide examples of what potential key terrain features would apply to their 
environments. Their examples demonstrate some of the unique features that can provide 
key terrain advantages in their domains, but do not alter the foundational concept of key 
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terrain. This observation leads one to believe that the doctrinal definition of key terrain 
already has the flexibility to be molded to the operation and the domain as long as it 
follows the guiding principles of the concept.  
The layers of cyberspace do challenge the definition but do not point to the 
necessity of creating a term. It is easy to see both sides of the argument but there is great 
value to maintaining a term that is used to describe a long-standing military strategy. 
There is no evidence exemplifying the value that would be added by developing a 
domain-specific definition for key terrain. The challenge to its application does not 
inherently lie in the absence of a doctrinal definition for the domain, but more in the 
understanding of the cyber terrain. Therefore, use of the traditional key terrain definition 
will suffice in cyberspace. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The general concept of key terrain is defined as “Any locality, or area, the seizure 
or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant” (USJCS, 2009, II-
13). When examining the terrain at each of the layers of cyberspace, there are inarguably 
certain terrain features that the seizure or retention of which will afford an advantage. 
Despite the complexity of the cyber domain the principal concept remains the same, only 
key terrain “involves network links and nodes that are essential to a particular friendly or 
adversary capability” (USJCS, 2013a, II-10). “Any area or locality” can encompass key 
points of access, social media accounts, or physical wires. Seizure of these may be 
identified as key terrain and essential in a defensive or offensive cyber operation. An 
operation to suppress an enemy’s information operation campaign may determine a web 
address or social media account used to distribute propaganda as key terrain due to the 
advantages of its seizure and retention. 
The absence of a cyber-specific key terrain definition does not distract from its 
application to cyberspace. When taking the concept of key terrain at its definitional root 
and applying it to cyberspace, it appears to have value. When disregarding the 
complexities and abstraction of cyberspace it is even clearer that the concept of key 
terrain applies to the cyber domain. However, the non-physical layers of cyberspace do 
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present the largest challenge to the concept’s applicability in cyberspace. The 
characteristics of cyberspace terrain will have to be continuously monitored and mapped 
to ensure effectiveness of key terrain identification. The challenges do not remove its 
applicability, they simply require the need for additional care when identifying cyber key 
terrain. However, despite all this, the concept offers benefits or utility and should be 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. OVERALL EVALUATION 
This thesis determines that the concept of key terrain can apply to the three layers 
of cyberspace. Its application is done so in a similar manner as the other domains. The 
previous chapter concludes that cyber key terrain identification takes more thought, must 
account for additional considerations, and is not clear cut. Key terrain in cyberspace is also 
not as easy to visualize like other domains. However, these challenges do not take away 
from the fact that the concept of key terrain applies and holds value in the context of 
military cyberspace operations.  
In answering the research question this thesis discovers important considerations 
that influence the application of key terrain in cyberspace. These considerations are 
summarized here: 
 Key terrain requires constant reassessment of the cyber terrain due its 
dynamic nature. 
 Seizure and retention of key terrain can be difficult to measure. 
 Key terrain only exists under certain conditions, therefore context matters. 
 Understanding cyber key terrain is an art, not a science. 
 A cyber key terrain definition is not necessary but methods of application 
would be helpful. 
 Future doctrine, education and training is necessary in order to ensure that 
military tactics, strategies, and concepts such as key terrain are properly 
adapted in cyberspace. 
Chapter III presents the point that unlike the physical domains where terrain 
features remain fixed and geo-located, terrain in cyberspace allows for unpredictable 
changes to its terrain. This volatile terrain requires constant reassessment and analysis of 
the operational environment in which a mission will transpire. Identification of key terrain 
in cyberspace will require continual monitoring and evaluation as it could disappear or a 
more advantageous terrain feature could appear. The traits of cyber terrain will require 
some additional processes to current doctrine and planning as terrain analysis within the 
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cyber domain must occur continuously and often throughout the cyber planning process. 
Network mapping, scanning, and enumeration will play a large role in cyber terrain 
analysis, maintaining current snapshots of the cyber terrain. This consideration has great 
implications on how and where key terrain will be found. 
Chapter IV presents the fact that retention and seizure of terrain in cyberspace can 
be challenging to measure. Cyberspace’s malleable terrain allows the potential for multiple 
individuals to interact or maneuver with or through an object. This is done sometimes 
without opposing parties knowing the others are even there. There are also techniques such 
as use of rootkits that cloak or conceal access and activity from users or administrators. 
This can potentially make assessing the seizure or retention of key terrain difficult and 
should be a consideration when identifying key terrain. Choosing cyber terrain that can be 
controlled effectively or in a measurable way should be considered during planning. 
Monitoring tools and techniques will help assess the seizure and retention of a non-physical 
cyber terrain feature but could be flawed. 
Key terrain can only exist under certain conditions as presented in Chapter 2. 
Clarification between key terrain and other terms were established in Chapter 4. Careful 
consideration must be taken to ensure that the identification of key terrain and the use of its 
terminology are done in the correct context. The two needed components necessary to use 
the concept of key terrain in cyberspace are an operation (OCO, DCO, or DODIN-Ops) and 
an adversary (someone to apply the effect upon). If either of these two components are 
missing, the application of key terrain lacks the foundational principles set forth by military 
doctrine. The context must meet the correct conditions before key terrain becomes 
identifiable.  
Another consideration is that the identification of key terrain is an art more than a 
science. Every commander will identify key terrain based on the intelligence, counsel of 
staff, and understanding of the operational environment. Key terrain is not black and white 
in cyberspace, and it is important to note that it is not always so in the other domains. 
Cyberspace’s unique characteristics and an individual’s technical skills, analytical skills, 
and overall creativity will result in variances in key terrain identification. Differing choices 
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are not necessarily wrong. This does not discredit the identification of key terrain but 
planners must understand that there may not be definitive answers as to what is key terrain. 
Chapter IV concludes with the assessment that a cyber-specific key terrain 
definition adds no value. Despite the varying environments of the warfighting domains, 
they do not specify domain specific key terrain definitions. The cyber domain is no 
different and relies on the traditional definition of key terrain in its doctrine. The belief is 
that the concept of key terrain is clearly defined in military doctrine and it is worded in 
such a way that it can be shaped to fit into any domain regardless of how malleable or 
complex it is. Military leaders already understand the concept in the physical domains and 
the creation of a separate definition only further segregates cyber from other domains. 
Maintaining the concept’s use in cyberspace will ensure that everyone understands what is 
cyber key terrain. 
The final consideration is made based on the overall assessment of this thesis. 
Clarity is needed in DOD’s cyber doctrine when discussing key terrain. Simply giving 
examples is not enough as there is not a one size fits all list of examples of cyber key 
terrain. Examples tend to be physical network layer devices and do not focus on non-
physical key terrain. Even more complicating is the issue that the DOD does not define the 
terrain of cyberspace as has been done with other domains (Raymond, Conti, Cross, 2014). 
More focus on defining cyber terrain will result in a better understanding of key terrain. 
Cyber warriors must study the basic concept of key terrain not only to ensure they have an 
understanding of the concept but also to effectively apply it to the cyber domain. 
Engraining the concept into the minds of the cyber work force similarly to that of ground 
fighting soldiers will ensure that the necessary analysis is taken and that the concept is 
properly executed in the cyber domain. Understanding of the concept of key terrain is 
engrained in officers in the Army through the Troop Leading Procedures at the company 
level and below and through the military decision making process for Battalion and higher 
echelons. The understanding of this concept is necessary for cyber warriors to defend this 
domain. Education of these warriors on the traditional concept of key terrain is essential to 
achieving cyber dominance. These cyber warriors are the future leaders and will be able to 
in turn educate and teach current commanders on the concept of key terrain in cyberspace. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis focused on determining if the concept of key terrain applied and if so 
held value in the cyber domain. This served as only a starting point to the potential of 
works that can progress and enhance understanding of the adaptation of military doctrine, 
strategy and tactics to cyberspace. This thesis exposed certain areas of study that would 
progress the development of cyber doctrine and the concept of key terrain in cyberspace. 
The recommendations focus on how to identify cyber key terrain, as it is a noted deficiency 
in the overall evaluation. The following are recommendations for future work and research 
that will further develop this topic: 
 Test current terrain analysis frameworks and tools to determine their 
effectiveness in identifying cyber key terrain. 
 Determine whether additional cyber domain doctrine will help to integrate 
military strategies like key terrain more effectively. 
 Identify changes DOD should make to institutional training, if any, in order 
to preserve military tactics, concepts, and strategies for future cyber 
warriors. 
Identifying a framework or tool that best assists in the identification of key terrain 
in cyberspace would prove beneficial and is an area of study that not many have attempted. 
The last two recommendations are focused on doctrine and training. Doctrine development 
within the cyber domain remains in the early stages and exploration into better integrating 
military strategies could prove beneficial to those working to develop relevant and effective 
doctrine on the subject. The final recommendation focuses on what the necessary changes, 
if any, the DOD should make to training cyber warriors on tactics and strategies in the 
cyber domain. All of these recommendations are in support of a better understanding 
within the cyber domain.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis outlined the importance of the concept of key terrain in cyber warfare 
and more specifically its importance to the U.S. military. The importance of the concept of 
key terrain has been taught by many great military strategists who helped shape DOD 
doctrine. Military strategy and tactics in cyberspace remain in the early stages of 
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development, but the foundational principles and doctrine used in the physical domains are 
key to providing the direction for strategy implementation. When taking the concept of key 
terrain and applying it to cyberspace, there are notable uses and benefits to its application. 
Looking at the topology of a network, there will always be certain cyber elements that, 
when controlled, will allow for an advantage to friendly maneuverability or halting of 
enemy maneuverability. The instincts to challenge the concept’s applicability in cyberspace 
are more likely rooted in unfamiliarity or misunderstanding of the cyber domain. Cyber 
operations warrant the same planning responsibilities as in any other domain and the 
identification of key terrain is no different. 
This thesis only scratches the surface on the overarching challenge of adapting 
military doctrine to the cyber domain. Stating that it is a challenge may be an 
understatement. The real issue lies in a better understanding of doctrine and concepts prior 
to applying them to the cyber domain. Continuing to use buzz words or popular military 
terms without true understanding of their meaning can lead to misconceptions. This 
recommendation is only the beginning of an effort to question and challenge whether the 
traditional military tactics apply to the cyber domain. Fostering this effort will result in a 
better understanding of how military tactics and strategy fit into the cyber domain.  
Future cyber strategists will emerge and pave the way for achieving cyber 
dominance, but analysis of concepts like key terrain must be examined. Future cyber 
strategists and military minds will have to break from the traditional mindset when 
identifying key terrain in cyberspace. At the end of the day there is no right or wrong 
answer as to what key terrain is, the more important point is that something must be 
identified as key terrain. Key terrain will not matter unless the mission is successful. 
Clausewitz alludes to this point, stating that “the occupation [key terrain] is nothing but a 
raised arm, and the position itself only a lifeless tool. … The real thrust and blow, the 
object, the value is victory in battle” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 354). 
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